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EUTHANASIA CONSIDERED AS DEVICE PARADIGM 
Pieter Tijmes, University of Twente 
In this paper I take as my point of departure the way euthanasia has been legally settled in the 
Netherlands. My concern is not with the question whether euthanasia is morally or religiously 
acceptable. In my view, philosophy is not well equipped to answer this question. Of course, it can sort 
out arguments for and against euthanasia; it can analyze and assess them. But it cannot speak with any 
authority about the pros and cons of the subject itself. Most arguments, even if valid, fail to seem 
cogent to opponents. Therefore, I shall try to avoid the moral issue and focus my attention on the 
regulation of euthanasia, with a glance at the practice of Dutch physicians.  
After introducing the Dutch case, I shall interpret this situation from the perspective of the so-called 
device paradigm of technology. According to this interpretation technology is the characteristic of 
contemporary life. Looking at euthanasia through the spectacles of the device paradigm accentuates 
two specific features: namely, the role of the expert and the place of pain in a technological context.  
THE DUTCH CASE  
Philippe Ariès, the historian of death, has many times emphasized that in traditional societies a 
deathbed is not the physician s department. At the deathbed, his part has been played out. It was his 
office to help people to avoid the evils of sickness, physical deficiencies, ailments of old age and a 
premature death. But there were moments when nothing could be done. In the end nobody could be 
saved from death. In modern society the physician s task has been enormously extended in the sense 
that our whole life has been brought under a medical regime. Medical examinations are the order of 
the day. It is impossible to avoid the physician when going to school, doing sports, having a job, 
taking out a life insurance policy, etc. Our health is controlled as a matter of routine. In our modern 
societies it is not only a question of medicalization of life, but also of death. That means that decisions 
at the end of the patient s life are increasingly becoming one of the medical responsibilities. The result 
is that our death has become artificial. Today a natural death is likely an exception to the norm. Thus 
in normal cases the physician swings the scepter at our last bed by prompting the possibilities and 
impossibilities left to us. I have to be cautious; I speak about a trend. A hundred years ago in some 
municipalities in the Netherlands more than half of all deceased had no physician s assistance. That is 
now inconceivable. Whoever is unwell hurries up to make at least a short visit to the hospital in order 
to make use of the paraphernalia of modern medicine.  
Many bitter deaths might be a product of modern medical science because postponement of death due 
to medical monitoring in a sense requires its toll. But, fortunately, the modern physician is not left 
with empty hands when confronted with the bitter pains of the last sickness. He has means to alleviate 
them at his disposal. This has become part of terminal care with which a physician is entrusted. In this 
sense one can say that dying has also been brought under the medical regime. Euthanasia is a separate 
chapter in the sense that in the view of the Dutch, terminal care is considered as medical  
practice, but euthanasia is not considered as medical practice. Let me explain this Dutch subtlety.  
Euthanasia is defined as purposefully acting to terminate life, by a person other than the person 
concerned, upon request of the latter. To avoid any misunderstanding, the acting person intended here 
is the physician. This acting is to be distinguished from physician-assisted suicide which refers to 
prescription, supply, or administration of drugs with the explicit intention of shortening life at the 
patient's request. Euthanasia is also clearly to be distinguished from the following phenomena:  
a) the non-treatment decision: the stopping or omitting of treatment when treatment is senseless 
according to medical judgment although treatment would probably have prolonged life;  
b) an alleviation of pain and symptoms with opioids in such dosages that the patient s life might have 
been shortened; in this case shortening of life is an unintentional side effect;  
c) the refusal of treatment of the person concerned, even when the non-treatment has the consequence 
of his or her death;  
d) the refusal of food by the patient (starving oneself).  
The term euthanasia is appropriate only when the patient requests an intervention by means of a 
written advance directive.  
It should be emphasized that euthanasia and help at suicide are prohibited in the Netherlands, although 
both are done upon request of the patient. They are an issue of the criminal code, and as such they are 
punishable acts. That is also the reason why euthanasia cannot be considered as a medical act. If it 
were a medical act it could not be a punishable act. A physician acting according to the standards of 
the medical profession does not offend the law. But to save euthanasia as a crime it cannot be 
considered as medical practice. But there is a way out: a physician who assists people in their dying 
(euthanasia and suicidal help) may appeal to circumstances beyond his control. The criminal offense 
has taken place, but it is not punished, because it has been a question of emergency. There was a 
conflict of obligations: on the one hand the obligation to protect life, and on the other the obligation to 
relieve a person from unbearable suffering.  
The physician is obligated to report his case of euthanasia. Then the public prosecutor judges the state 
of emergency. The physician may go free, if he has carefully followed nine guidelines: (1) the 
patient's request is voluntary, and (2) well considered. (3) It is a matter of a longstanding desire to die. 
(4) Suffering is not acceptable for the patient. (5) The physician should have a consultation with a 
colleague. (6) Diagnosis, course of illness, and alternative therapies are to be explained to the patient. 
(7) Relatives should be informed unless the patient did not wish this. (8) A written report describing 
decision making, and (9) mentioning this to a coroner are also obligatory.  
Preparing my paper I found a lot of discussion on end-of-life decisions in the newspapers. Three 
topics were favorite. In the first place much attention was paid to the evaluation of the behavior of 
physicians with regard to the guidelines. Most doctors do not report that they are involved with 
euthanasia. Only 40% of the cases of euthanasia have been reported. That means that the rest of the 
cases are not announced and the procedure remains untested. The reason is quite clear: doctors do not 
like to subject their medical conduct to the public prosecutor. Not reporting means fewer formalities. 
It irritates a lot of them that what in their eyes is normal medical behavior is in fact a crime. One of the 
proposals, as a result of these investigations, is that doctors should report their cases to a committee of 
experts of the medical, judicial, and ethical professions. If the case does not comply with the 
guidelines, then it will be referred to the public prosecutor. In this way, this commission can hold the 
public prosecutor at a distance. A separate question is when the announcement should take place: 
before or after carrying out euthanasia. The crux of the whole affair is that this procedure around 
euthanasia is a political compromise between Dutch liberals and Social Democrats on the one hand 
and Christian Democrats on the other. In so far as this proposal amounts to decriminalizing 
euthanasia, it will not receive all-out support from the Christian Democrats, because it might have the 
tendency to undermine the original compromise.  
In the second place, many emotions were evoked in the newspapers on the practice of end-of-life 
decisions in nursing homes when old people suffering from senile dementia refuse to eat and drink.  
And last but not least, the third topic of attention was the book of the American psychiatrist, Hendin, 
on the practice of euthanasia in the Netherlands. He attributed much hypocrisy to the Dutch practice of 
euthanasia. It goes without saying that the Dutch like admiration but not critique. He reproaches the 
Dutch that they do not understand the difference between euthanasia and sedative treatment that might 
lead to death. To him sedative treatment is an alternative to euthanasia.  
These three topics were discussed in many articles in all the newspapers. At least one might say that 
there is a Dutch willingness to discuss these matters, and it will probably contribute to a greater 
openness to and tolerance of euthanasia as a possibility. After this brief look at the Dutch case I shall 
introduce the perspective of the device paradigm.  
THE SPECTACLES OF THE DEVICE PARADIGM  
In his book, Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life, Albert Borgmann develops his 
theory of the device paradigm as a characteristic feature of modern technology. It stands for a specific 
pattern. In short, technology is a matter of devices that procure commodities. The car, the coffee 
machine, the water tap, air-conditioning, electric lines, the refrigerator, etc.all are examples of devices 
that procure commodities. The car yields speed, the coffee machine coffee, the water tap water, the air 
conditioner fresh air, the electric lines electricity, etc. These commodities are technologically 
available to us and are supposed to enrich our lives. They do so without imposing burdens on us. We 
ask for the ninth symphony of Beethoven and we put the compact disc on the CD player. We put the 
ignition key in our car and we have the speed we want. We turn the tap and we have clean water 
without delay. We dive into the refrigerator . . . and so on. It looks as if technology paves the way to 
the land of Cockaigne. This availability of goods is interpreted by Borgmann as the fulfillment of the 
promise of technology. Something is available if it has been rendered instantaneous, ubiquitous, safe 
and easy (p. 41). We have to take notice that this availability of commodities procured by devices 
belongs to the foreground of technology. This foreground has its condition in the concealment of the 
machinery of the devices. We use the computer as typewriter without any knowledge of the machinery 
of that device. It does not matter whether our watch is digital or mechanical with regard to the 
indication of time. We enjoy the disposal of all sorts of goods, but know nothing about the background 
of technology. This has far-reaching and breathtaking consequences for the labor process, the division 
of labor, the relation of labor and leisure, our relationship towards reality, etc. It is even more exciting 
to discover that this pattern of the device paradigm is to be recognized in all our societal and political 
processes. In this regard Borgmann s book is a stimulating eye-opener. The device paradigm stands 
for and teaches us a specific pattern how to deal with our problems. We want to get what we like in an 
easy, safe, and instantaneous way. Thus we embrace the medicalization of our life on the supposition 
and trust that it yields health.  
What does it mean if one looks at euthanasia from a technological point of view? Looking at it with 
the spectacles of the device paradigm I shall only accentuate two aspects: the role of the expert, and 
the technological unburdening of dying a so-called "commodity" of the device paradigm. The 
formulation is rather paradoxical. Fulfilment of the wish to die is not a triumph as is most 
technological acting, but rather a failure, a defeat of life. But it has nevertheless all the characteristics 
of technological acting.  
THE ROLE OF THE EXPERT  
The doctor plays the role of the expert in this procedure. He considers the question. To put it quite 
straight: the patient should pass an exam and the expert is examiner. He scrutinizes whether the wish 
to die is voluntary, whether it is well considered, whether the wish has been longstanding, and not 
liable to emotions, etc. The physician examines whether the suffering is unacceptable to the patient. 
What at first sight seems to be a matter of self-determination turns out to be a matter of complete 
dependency. With regard to questions of death a strong re-evaluation of the physician s position has 
taken place. In former times absent at the deathbed, now prominently present. Research has 
demonstrated that well educated people have more chances to get their request granted than those who 
are less educated. Those who show much emotion will be confronted with a negative answer. And so 
on. The physician finds himself in the position of the expert because he has access to lethal drugs. 
This technologically privileged position maneuvers him at the same time into the role of moral 
examiner. It is society that attributes this role to the doctor in an ambivalent way. He is a technological 
expert but at the same time he has been prohibited to act medically. The inaccessibility of lethal drugs 
makes the whole procedure into a technological adventure in which the patient is incompetent. Being 
alienated from nature, the patient has no knowledge about the herbs and fruits in his own garden. 
Confronted with these final questions he has to throw himself into the arms of the experts. Tried and 
tested methods out of ancient times have been blotted out.  
UNBURDENING OF DYING  
The question on the deathbed is often relief of the burden of pain. It is technologically transformed 
into a mild death. The modern doctor declares war on the pain and he kills it in a technological and 
radical way. Neither the patient nor the doctor has any understanding of the meaning of pain as in 
former days. Both talk about pain completely along technological lines. We do not hold the opinion 
any longer that pain should be tolerated, alleviated, and interpreted. The medicalization of pain robs a 
culture of an integrative program of treatment of pain. Opium, acupuncture, or hypnosis were means 
of alleviating pain, but they were always put into practice in combination with language, rites, and 
myth (Illich, 1975).  
Of course, there are people who want to raise the moral or religious question with regard to 
euthanasia, and they declare themselves against it. Most people who are morally against euthanasia 
support sedative treatment. Their position shows how difficult it is to leave the technological society 
behind, because from a technological point of view (not moral), euthanasia is not very different from 
sedative treatment. A question of hours or days. It belongs to our technological society that we cannot 
deal with pain. One is not responsible for it. Here again one discovers that technology is not a means 
for a specific end, but a transformation of a problem.  
Living in a technological society may be compared with climbing mountains. Whoever thinks that he 
has gone up too high should try to go down very carefully if at all possible. One can imagine that 
under some circumstances going down might be more difficult than going up. If he cannot tolerate it 
any longer, who dares to ask his neighbor to interpret the meaning of his pain? Has not our modern 
society left these questions behind itself?  
Two years ago a friend of mine got a brain tumor. When his situation and prospect were clear to him, 
he made two appointments with his family and his doctor. In the first place he wanted euthanasia to be 
executed if he got into an irreversible coma with no prospect. In the second place he wanted no drugs 
to alleviate the pain, because he did not want to die as a rich man in the West. He interpreted his dying 
as a pilgrimage in which millions of people before him took part. I do not tell this story about this 
curious form of solidarity as an example or an appeal to us who like to climb mountains of technology 
but only as a testimony concerning a possibility partly outside the thin air of technology.  
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